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1 Introduction
A recent paper by Oded Galor and David N Weil (1996) makes an impor-
tant contribution to our understanding of the interrelationships among fe-
male labor supply, fertility choices and growth in real wages, by presenting
a tractable overlapping generations (OLG) model in which these can be for-
mally analysed as endogenous variables. The core of the model is the idea
that increasing capital per worker raises the relative wage of women, this
reduces family size, since child-rearing and female labour supply are substi-
tutes1, and this in turn increases capital per worker. The wages of men and
women differ because women supply only labor that is complementary to
capital, whereas men supply not only this but also labor that is neither a
complement nor a substitute to capital. This allows the fact of an increase in
the women’s wage relative to that of men over time, the diminishing “gender
gap”, to be captured in a relatively simple way.
The data presented in Table 1 for a group of developed economies cer-
tainly confirms, for each country individually, the idea of a negative rela-
tionship between female employment and fertility over time. What is also
immediately apparent, however, is that this negative relationship no longer
holds across countries. As Figures 1 and 2 show, it existed in 1970 but not in
1990. For example, in 1990 Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain have
substantially lower female employment, but also very much lower fertility
rates, than the US, Canada, the UK, France and the Scandinavian countries.
In the latter group of countries a larger growth in female employment over
the period 1970-1990 was accompanied by much smaller falls in fertility than
in the former group2.
Detailed empirical work3 has suggested that a likely explanation for these
across-country differences is to be found in the effects of their tax and social
security contribution structures, in combination with the cost and availibility
of child care outside the home4. These parameters determine the terms of
1There is of course a positive effect of real income growth on fertility, but the model is
so structured that this is outweighed by the substitution effect.
2There is a strong presumption, in at least some of the countries with low female
employment, that this is actually the desired policy outcome. The irony is that the low
fertility in these countries is the precise opposite of what is supposed to happen: making
female labor force participation difficult does not result in higher fertility, but simply in
lower levels of both labor supply and fertility.
3See for example Gustafsson (1985), and Fenge and Ochel (2001).
4For example, in Germany married women entering the labor force face: joint taxation
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the trade-off between family size and female labor supply, with sharp differ-
ences among countries5 in the nature of this trade-off and the corresponding
equilibrium choices of these variables. The aim of this paper is to extend
the Galor-Weil model to allow a formal analysis of the way the public fi-
nance regime and child care substitution possibilities interact to determine
the relationship between female employment and fertility6.
Table 1 and Figures 1,2 about here
An important feature of the Galor-Weil model is the very simple child
care production function. There is a fixed requirement of the mother’s time
per unit of child care. In this paper we extend this by allowing for substi-
tution between parental time and a bought-in child care input in a standard
production function. This simple and, we believe, realistic extension has
surprisingly important implications. There need no longer be an inverse re-
lationship between female labor supply and fertility. This suggests that the
undoubtedly negative relationship that has existed empirically, and which is
captured effectively in the Galor-Weil model, really does result, as the empir-
ical evidence suggests, from inadequate possibilities of substitution between
different forms of child care.
A further empirical fact, not captured in the Galor-Weil model, is the
significant variation in female labor supply and fertility across households
within a given economy. This has lead some influential writers in this area
to advocate the stick of tax penalties for households that choose low fertility,
in addition to the carrot of higher transfer payments per child, as policies to
reverse the fertility decline. At the same time, the system of taxation and
child-related transfers may imply substantial income redistributions across
households, and, as we show below, there are reasons to believe that these
may involve serious horizontal inequities. It seems to us useful therefore to
(income splitting), implying a relatively high marginal tax rate; social security contribu-
tions well in excess of their incremental actuarial value; very scarce and expensive pre-
school child care facilities; and half-day schooling, implying that typically children return
home from school at midday.
5Across-country differences in the parameters of the Galor-Weil model – preferences
for children relative to consumption, time required per unit of child care, and relative
male and female labor productivities - could of course be proposed as accounting for the
variation in outcomes, but this seems a priori implausible given the broad similarities of
the economic characteristics of the two groups of countries.
6For a substantial body of work which considers issues of family taxation, including
its effect on fertility, from the more usual public finance standpoint, see Balestrino et al
(2002), Cigno (1986), (2001), and Cigno and Pettini (2001).
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extend the model to include households of different types, so that the issues
arising out of differences in household choices can be formally analysed.
We therefore extend the Galor-Weil model in three main ways. First,
we introduce a public sector, which taxes labor supplies, pays a fixed grant
per child, and may subsidise bought-in child care. Secondly, we extend the
technology of child care, replacing the fixed parental time input by a pro-
duction function that allows smooth substitution between parental time and
a market child care input. Finally, we distinguish between household types
according to their productivities in child care, thus allowing explicit analysis
of variations in household choices. Our primary concern in this paper is with
the effect of the tax regime and child support system on the steady state of
the model, and so, in contrast to the Galor-Weil paper, our analysis of the
model’s dynamics is confined to showing that a stable steady state exists.
In the next section we set out the model with only one household type. In
section 3 we derive the main policy propositions. In section 4 we extend
these for the case of different household types. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We take fertility and female labor supply decisions as endogenous, and anal-
yse the effects of taxation and policies toward child care and child support in
a 3-period OLG model, in which explicit account is taken of child care costs.
Individuals spend the first period of their lives as children, being cared for
by their parents, the second period of their lives working, saving, and caring
for their children, and the third period in retirement, when they consume the
proceeds of their saving7. We call the type of labor supplied by both men
and women type-1 labor, and that supplied only by men type-2 labor8, with
the corresponding (gross of tax) wage rates w1t and w2t respectively.
7For simplicity, we ignore the existence of state pensions on retirement. The formal
reason is that, since the present value of the pension will affect saving and fertility decisions,
these then become functions of the interest rate.This in turn implies that the basic equation
of motion of the system becomes a second order nonlinear difference equation, which
complicates the analysis of the dynamics, without adding anything of interest in the present
context. In Apps and Rees (2001), we use such a model to examine issues of pensions policy.
8Galor-Weil call these types of labor “mental” and “physical” labor respectively. Per-
haps better would be “services” and “manufacturing”, as long as it is understood that the
economy produces only one physical output.
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2.1 The household model
As in the Galor-Weil model, the household utility function takes the form9
ut = γ lnnt + (1− γ) ln ct+1 (1)
where ct+1 is consumption in the retirement phase and nt denotes the number
of children10, both chosen by the household at time t. Let zt ∈ [0, 1] denote
the time the female earner in a household spends in child care, so that 1− zt
is her market labor supply, and xt the amount of a bought-in market good
used in child care. The male earner in a household is assumed to supply 1
unit of time inelastically to each type of labor, and none to child care. The
production function for child care11
nt = f(zt, xt) (2)
is assumed linear homogeneous, continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave.
We assume initially that there is a single tax rate τt. A male worker earns
the net of tax wage
wmt = (1− τt)(w1t + w2t) (3)
and a female the net of tax wage
wft = (1− τt)w1t (4)
The household’s budget constraint is then
st + (1− σt)xt = wmt + wft(1− zt) + gtnt (5)
where st is the household’s saving, and so
ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)st (6)
9It is, as Galor and Weil argue, a harmless simplification to take consumption in the
working period to be zero.
10As in the Galor-Weil model, this is actually the number of pairs of children. nit = 1
implies that the population of two-person households just reproduces itself.
11No confusion should result from treating the number of children and the quantity of
“child care output” as identical.
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with rt+1 the one-period interest rate, paid at t+1. The price of the bought-
in child care good is 1, but there may be a subsidy from the government of
σt > 0 per unit. Moreover, the government pays a grant12 of gt > 0 per child.
One formulation of the household’s optimisation problem would be to
maximise (1) subject to (2) - (4), but it is convenient instead to solve the
problem in two stages. First, the household takes an efficient child care
production decision by solving13
minCt = wftzt + (1− σt)xt (7)
s.t. nt = f(zt, xt) (8)
yielding the child care cost function
Ct = p(wft, σt)nt (9)
and child care input demand functions14
z∗t = zˆ(wft, σt)nt (10)
x∗t = xˆ(wft, σt)nt (11)
where zˆt = zˆ(wft, σt) and xˆt = xˆ(wft, σt) are given by the respective deriva-
tives of the unit cost function p(wft, σt)
∂p(wft, σt)
∂wft
= zˆt; −∂p(wft, σt)
∂σt
= xˆt (12)
and are the input requirements for one unit of child care.
The household’s problem15 can then be written16
max γ lnnt + (1− γ) ln ct+1 = ut (13)
12Clearly, both this grant and the child care subsidy could be related to household
income, either by means-testing, or by making them part of taxable income. Alternatively
they could take the form of tax allowances. For example, Australia has “family tax
benefits” that are means tested on household income and spouse’s income. In Canada,
the secondary earner is allowed to set child care expenditures, up to a cerain maximum,
against taxable income. Here for simplicity we assume they are independent of income.
13We assume an interior solution. Extensions of the argument to corner solutions is
straightforward.
14Throughout this paper, an asterisk denotes an optimal value of a choice variable.
15Note that it must be assumed that the household has perfect foresight at t of the
interest rate rt+1, which is not determined until time t+1. This is a standard assumption
in OLG models.
16We assume throughout that p(w2t, σt) > gt, the child payment is always less than the
unit cost of a child.
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s.t. [p(wft, σt)− gt]nt + ct+1
(1 + rt+1)
= wmt + wft ≡ Wt (14)
whereWt is household net full income
17, as compared to its net labor income,
wmt +wft(1− zt). The solution to this problem yields fertility, consumption
and saving functions
n∗t =
γWt
p(wft, σt)− gt (15)
c∗t+1 = (1− γ)Wt(1 + rt+1) (16)
s∗t = (1− γ)Wt (17)
Note that, as a result of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, neither fertil-
ity nor saving are functions of the interest rate. This, a feature shared with
the Galor-Weil model, implies a substantial simplification of the model’s dy-
namics.
As we shall see, an important role is played in the policy analysis by the
relationship between fertility and the female net wage, wft. In the Galor-Weil
model, this is always negative. The generalisation we have made to permit
substitutability between parental time and bought-in child care has a quite
significant impact on this result, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1. If the time spent in domestic child care is sufficiently
small relative to the strength of the preference for children, in a sense to be
defined below, fertility increases with the female net wage.
The exact conditions on which this proposition holds depend on whether
the change in the female net wage is due to a change in the gross wage, or to
a change in her marginal tax rate. In the latter case it matters whether the
tax rates of both spouses change, or whether we consider changes in the tax
rates separately. It is useful for the later policy analysis to give the results
for each of the possibilities.
(a) Change in the gross wage. Differentiating in (15) with respect to w1t,
recalling (3), (4) and (14) gives
∂n∗t
∂w1t
=
(1− τt)(2γ − z∗t )
pt − gt (18)
Thus
∂n∗t
∂w1t
> 0⇔ 2γ > z∗t (19)
17That is, the after tax income it would earn if all time was used for market labor supply.
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Recall that γ is the exponent of nt in the utility function, while z
∗
t ∈ [0, 1].
Thus this condition is certainly satisfied if γ > 0.5, and γ can be smaller,
for given n∗t , the smaller is zˆt, the domestic time input per child, and so the
larger is xˆt, the bought-in child care.
(b) Change in the marginal tax rate of both spouses. Then we have
∂n∗t
∂τt
=
w1tz
∗
t − γ(2w1t + w2t)
pt − gt (20)
Thus
∂n∗t
∂τt
< 0⇔ (2 + w2t
w1t
)γ > z∗t (21)
It is therefore more likely that fertility increases with a rise in the female
net wage in this case, because the male net wage also rises, and this has an
additional income effect. We can think of the ratio w2t/w1t as a measure
of the “gender gap”, because w2t is the difference between male and female
wage rates, and so this condition is more likely to be satisfied, the larger the
gender gap.
There is an interesting alternative way of expressing this condition. Clearly
the sign of ∂n∗t/∂τt is unchanged when we multiply through (20) by (1− τt),
and so we can write
(1− τt)∂n
∗
t
∂τt
=
(1− τt)w1tz∗t
pt − gt − n
∗
t (22)
So18
∂n∗t
∂τt
< 0⇔ (1− τt)w1tz∗t < n∗(pt − gt)⇔ n∗gt < (1− σt)x∗t (23)
Thus a fall in the tax rate, increasing the female net wage, will increase
fertility if the cost of the mother’s time spent in child-rearing is less than the
total cost of the children, net of child payments, or equivalently if the cost
of bought-in child care is greater than the total value of child payments.
(c) Only the wife’s tax rate changes. Let τf and τm denote the female and
male tax rates respectively. Then the fertility demand function becomes
n∗t =
γ[(1− τf )w1t + (1− τm)(w1t + w2t)]
p[(1− τf )w1t, σ]− gt (24)
18Recall that pt = (1− τt)w1tzˆt + (1− σt)xˆt.
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and
∂n∗t
∂τf
=
w1t(z
∗
t − γ)
pt − gt (25)
Thus
∂n∗t
∂τf
< 0⇔ γ > z∗t (26)
Again by rewriting this condition we obtain an interesting alternative inter-
pretation. Multiplying through (25) by (1− τf )/n∗ will not change its sign,
and, defining ωt ≡ (1− τf )w1t/Wt, the female’s proportional contribution to
net household full income19, we can rewrite the condition as
∂n∗t
∂τf
< 0⇔ ωt
1− ωt [(1− σt)xˆt − gt] > (1− τf )w1tzˆt (27)
Thus the larger the wife’s proportional contribution to net household full
income (the smaller the “gender gap”) and the larger the expenditure on
bought-in child care per child, the more likely it is that an increase in the
female net wage, induced by a fall in her tax rate, will increase fertility.
(d) Only the husband’s tax rate changes. Then we have simply
∂n∗t
∂τm
=
−γ(w1t + w2t)
pt − gt < 0 (28)
Since the husband does not in this model contribute time to child care, a
change in his tax rate has only an income effect.
The intuition for these results rests on the comparison of income and
price effects. When, as in the Galor-Weil model, the only input into child-
rearing is the woman’s time, while she contributes only a proportion of the
household’s income, then the effect of an increase in her net wage in raising
the unit cost of a child always outweighs the effect on household income -
the negative price effect dominates the positive income effect. When however
there is a second input into child-rearing, so that the cost of the woman’s
time is only a proportion of the total cost, then this need no longer be
true. For example, (27) shows that where the woman is contributing close
to half the net household full income, there is no child care subsidy nor child
payment, and the cost of bought-in child care exceeds the cost of the mother’s
19Note, full income, not labor income, and so this depends only on wage and tax rates,
and not on female labor supply.
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time sufficiently, then increasing her net wage by reducing only her tax rate
increases fertility - the income effect outweighs the negative price effect.
This is very relevant to the across-country comparisons made in the in-
troduction to this paper. Given the positive elasticity of female labor supply
with respect to the net wage, the less strongly negative is the fertility elas-
ticity with respect to the wage, the weaker will be the negative association
between female employment and fertility in an economy characterized by
growth in the female relative wage over time.
2.2 The aggregate economy
The number of active households, Nt, evolves according to
Nt = n
∗
t−1Nt−1 (29)
We adopt the aggregate production function of the Galor-Weil model
Yt = A[αK
a
t +(1−α)(Lft )a]
1
a +BNt A,B > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), a ∈ (−∞, 1) (30)
where the elasticity of substitution ε = 1/(1 − a). Since each male supplies
one unit of type 2 labor inelastically, the total supply of this isNt, the number
of active households at time t. Since each male also supplies one unit of type
1 labor inelastically, while each female supplies (1− z∗t ) units, we have
Lft = Nt(2− z∗t ) (31)
The production function can then be written in per-household terms as
yt = A[αk
a
t + (1− α)lat ]
1
a +B (32)
where
lt =
Lft
Nt
= (2− z∗t ) (33)
Given the standard competitive market assumptions we have
w2t = B (34)
w1t = (1− α)la−1t A[αkat + (1− α)lat ]
1
a
−1 (35)
The capital stock in each period is determined by the saving of the active
households in the previous period, so that
Kt+1 = Nts
∗
t (36)
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Finally, we have the government budget constraint20, written in per-household
terms,
τt[w1t(2− z∗t ) + w2t]− gtn∗t − σtx∗t = 0 (37)
This says simply that tax revenue on labor incomes must cover expenditures
on child payments and subsidies on child care, if any.
2.3 Existence of a stable steady state
The basic equation that determines the dynamics of the system is
kt+1 =
Kt+1
Nt+1
=
Nts
∗
t
Nt+1
=
(1− γ)Wt
n∗t
(38)
This gives rise to a first order nonlinear difference equation.
Since the purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the steady
state, we shall deal rather briefly with the model’s dynamics.21 All we really
need to confirm is that a stable steady state of the model exists. The rest of
the paper will then be concerned with the comparative statics of this steady
state. Furthermore, in showing that a stable steady state exists we shall
focus on the basic model without a public sector, the main difference to the
Galor-Weil model then being that as the wage rate rises, households can
smoothly substitute bought-in for domestic child care.
Substituting from (15) into (38) we can write the basic equation as
kt+1 =
(1− γ)
γ
p(w1t) (39)
Since
lt = 2− z∗t = 2− zˆ(w1t)n∗t = 2− zˆ(w1t)
γWt
p(w1t)
≡ l(w1t) (40)
We assume l
′
(w1t) > 0, i.e. the labor supply curve is never backward bending.
We can write (35) as
w1t = m(l(w1t), kt) (41)
20Note that this government budget constraint rules out borrowing: the budget must
balance in each period.
21The dynamic behavior of the model was of course the central concern of the Galor-Weil
paper.
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From this we obtain the derivative
dw1t
dkt
=
∂m
∂kt
(1− l′(w1t)∂m∂lt )
> 0 (42)
The sign follows since, from the CES production function, ∂m
∂lt
< 0, (dimin-
ishing marginal productivity of type 1 labor) and ∂m
∂kt
> 0, (capital and type
1 labor are complements). Thus (41) defines w1t as a strictly increasing func-
tion of kt, which we write as µ(kt), with µ
′
(kt) > 0 given by (42). Substituting
into (39) then gives
kt+1 =
(1− γ)
γ
p[µ(kt)] = ψ(kt) (43)
as the difference equation we need.
It is obvious from (35) that ψ(0) > 0. We also have
ψ
′
(kt) =
(1− γ)
γ
zˆtµ
′
(kt) > 0 (44)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a stable steady state is limkt→∞ ψ
′
(kt) =
0. Consider first µ
′
(kt). Now, zˆt is bounded below by zero, and lt above
by 2, thus suggesting it is reasonable to assume limkt→∞ l
′
(w1t) = 0 - ulti-
mately, an increasing wage cannot increase a household’s labor supply fur-
ther. From the CES production function, we can show that limkt→∞
∂m
∂kt
= 0
and limkt→∞
∂m
∂lt
6 0. Thus we can conclude that limkt→∞ µ
′
(kt) = 0. As kt
and w1t increase zˆt falls due to a substitution effect. We have not specified a
functional form, but zˆt must always lie in [0, 1], and it is reasonable to assume
that in the limit zˆt > 0. Thus we have limkt→∞ ψ
′
(kt) = 0, as required.
3 Fertility, female labor supply and policy in
the steady state
In this section we want to examine the way in which the tax system and the
system of child support, in conjunction with the cost and availability of child
care, influence the relationship between fertility and female labor supply in
the steady state. We denote a steady state value of a variable simply by
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deleting the t subscript. Then we have the following steady state system:
n∗ =
γW
p(wf , σ)− g (45)
z∗ = zˆ(wf , σ)n∗ (46)
x∗ = xˆ(wf , σ)n∗ (47)
w1 = (1− α)la−1A[αka + (1− α)la] 1a−1 (48)
wf = (1− τ)w1 (49)
k =
(1− γ)W
n∗
(50)
l = (2− z∗) (51)
0 = τ [w1(2− z∗) + w2]− gn∗ − σx∗ (52)
W = (1− τ)(2w1 + w2) (53)
Given the values of two of the three policy variables in (52), the remaining
policy variable and all endogenous variables are determined (recall that w2 =
B, a constant).
We wish to explore how the tax structure and the system of child support
determine the relationship between fertility and female labor supply. We
do this by carrying out a comparative statics analysis on the steady state
equilibrium, to see how changes in the policy parameters affect fertility n∗ and
female labor supply (1−z∗).We give the nature of the changes and summarise
the results here. The details of the analysis are given in the Appendix.
To sharpen the results we assume first that σ = 0, which is empirically
reasonable in most countries, and secondly, that we can ignore the general
equilibrium feedback effects of changes in the capital-labor ratio and the gross
wage w1. This latter is a strong assumption, but is made so that we can focus
on the policy issues of most concern for this paper. The general equilibrium
effects are typically ambiguous, in that the relevant derivatives can usually
not be uniquely signed, and this multiplies considerably the number of cases
that have to be considered without adding anything of substantive interest
by way of results.
(i) Child payments and taxation. Intuitively, we would think that the
higher the level of the child payment g, the higher must be the level of fertility
in an economy. Even if we take account of the fact that this would generally
imply higher taxation, the Galor-Weil model leads us to expect that, since
this reduces the female net wage, this would reinforce the increase in fertility.
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We would expect this to be at the expense of female labor supply. An increase
in g increases the demand for children and the required domestic time input,
and so female labor supply falls. Thus in two otherwise identical economies,
the one with higher child payments and taxes might be expected to have lower
female labor supply and higher fertility. However, we saw in Proposition 1
that, under reasonable conditions, raising the tax rate could reduce fertility.
Moreover, reducing female labor supply reduces the tax base, and makes the
increase in tax rate required to fund a given increase in g higher than where
this effect is absent. It is therefore possible that an economy with higher tax
levels and child payments could actually have both lower female labor supply
and lower fertility. We confirm this possibility in
Proposition 2: Given an initial steady state equilibrium, revenue neutral
increases in g and τ reduce fertility if and only if
τ
zˆ
∂zˆ
∂τ
>
(1− γ)
z∗
(2 +
w2
w1
) (54)
The left hand side of this condition is the elasticity of domestic child care per
child with respect to the tax rate. In the Galor-Weil model this is necessarily
zero, while in the present model this is positive and larger, the larger the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and bought-in child care, which
in turn will depend on the quality of the latter. The right hand side will be
smaller the greater the preference for children relative to consumption, the
smaller the gender gap, and the more time women currently spend looking
after children.
(ii) Effects of the system of child support. In this model, child support
takes the form of a child payment g and possibly a subsidy for bought-in child
care σ. Though increases in both can be expected to increase fertility, they
have very different effects on female labor supply. An increase in g can be
expected to reduce female labor supply, since it does not change the relative
prices of the different forms of child care. An increase in σ on the other hand
will induce a substitution of bought-in for domestic child care, and so this
will tend to offset the effect of increasing fertility in reducing female labor
supply. Moreover, the requirement that substitution of one form of support
for the other be revenue neutral has important implications for the relative
sizes of the changes that can be made. The overall outcome of these effects
is given by
Proposition 3: An increase in the subsidy to bought-in child care, σ,
financed by a reduction in the child payment, g, increases both female labor
14
supply and fertility.
We can show22 that the total derivative of fertility with respect to g is
dn∗
dg
= − τw1n
∗
(p− g)
∂zˆ
∂σ
∆−1 (55)
where ∆ < 0 is the marginal cost23 to the government of an increase in σ.
Since ∂zˆ/∂σ < 0, this expression is negative, implying that fertility increases
with a reduction in g. We see that this increase is larger, the higher the
female wage, the higher the tax rate, the greater the reduction in domestic
child care resulting from the subsidy increase, and the smaller the marginal
cost of the subsidy.
This result tells us that in two otherwise identical economies, the one
which places more weight on subsidising bought-in child care and less on
direct child payments will have both higher fertility and higher female labor
supply.
(iii) Interaction of tax and child support systems. Next, we consider the
effects of a reduction in the female tax rate financed by a reduction in the
child payment g. Since the male tax rate remains unchanged, this can be
thought of as a move away from a joint taxation system. Intuitively, one
would think this must result in a reduction in fertility, especially given the
a priori expectation that fertility and the female net wage are negatively
related. However, Proposition 1 earlier showed that this need not be the
case, and moreover, the revenue neutrality requirement can lead to counter-
intuitive results because of the induced effects on female labor supply. Thus
we have24
Proposition 4: Revenue neutral reductions in the female tax rate and
child payment certainly increase female labor supply, and increase fertility if
and only if
n∗τf
∂zˆ
∂τf
> 1− γ (56)
The intuition for this result is as follows. The larger is n∗, the more revenue
is released by a cut in g, and so the larger is the revenue neutral cut in the
22See the Appendix.
23This consists of the direct cost of the subsidy, plus the public expenditures arising out
of the induced increase in fertility, but net of the increased tax revenue resulting from the
increased female labor supply.
24See the Appendix for the derivation
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female tax rate.The greater the effect of the tax cut in reducing domestic time
input per child, the larger will be the increase in bought-in child care and
the more likely it is that both fertility and female labor supply will increase.
Finally, the stronger the relative preference for children in the household
utility function, as measured by γ, the more likely it is that fertility increases.
(iv) Effects of the tax structure. Suppose that initially joint taxation is
the case, so that male and female tax rates are equal, but that a move is made
in the direction of progressive individual taxation by reducing the female’s
tax rate τf and increasing that of the male, τm, in a revenue neutral way. We
then have
Proposition 5: A revenue neutral increase in the male tax rate and
decrease in the female tax rate certainly increases female labor supply, and
increases fertility if and only if
τf
zˆ
∂zˆ
∂τf
>
1− γ
γ
(57)
The left hand side is the elasticity of per unit domestic child care with respect
to the tax rate. This is positive, and larger, the greater the elasticity of
substitution between types of child care25. The right hand side is smaller, the
greater the relative preference for children in the household utility function.
There is certainly no reason in general why the condition may not hold.
The intuition underlying this condition is straightforward. An increase
in the male tax rate reduces fertility by an income effect, a reduction in the
female tax rate increases fertility by an income effect, while the increase in
the implicit price of a child tends to reduce fertility. Consideration of the
fertility demand function alone could then lead one to expect that the net
effect on fertility would be negative. However, given the revenue neutrality
requirement, the fact that female labor supply, and therefore the tax base,
increases, means that the reduction in the female’s tax rate can be larger
than the increase in the male’s tax rate26, and so, for a high enough female
labor supply elasticity, the overall effect can be a rise in fertility. Female
25The value of this elasticity of substitution will of course depend on the quality of
bought-in child care, which we take as given, although, arguably, this is also a policy
variable. Generally, anything which improves the quality of child care outside the home
strengthens the conclusions of this paper.
26Also important here is the fact that the male’s labor income is likely to be much larger
than the female’s.
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labor supply can increase, even though fertility increases, because of the
substitution of bought-in for domestic child care.
These results imply that in two otherwise identical economies, we would
be likely to observe both higher fertility and higher female labor supply in
an economy with progressive individual as opposed to joint taxation.
4 Heterogeneous households
Empirically there is a high degree of heterogeneity across households in two
respects that are of interest for this paper. Households differ significantly
in market labor supply of the female spouse, even after controlling for wage
rates and demographic characteristics, and they also differ in the number
of children, with a tendency for female labor supply and family size to be
inversely related. We now want to explore some of the issues raised by this
heterogeneity.
First we have to build into the model a reason for the heterogeneity. We
follow an argument of Gary Becker (1976), to the effect that differences in
physical and human capital across households can cause differences in pro-
ductivity in domestic production - here, child care - and that specialisation
will be in the direction of greater productivity. We therefore assume that
there are two types of households, indexed i = 1, 2, that differ in their un-
derlying child care production functions. Denoting the household that has
higher productivity in child care as type 1, this is assumed to imply the
inequalities27:
p1(wf , σ) < p2(wf , σ) (58)
zˆ1(wf , σ) > zˆ2(wf , σ) (59)
xˆ1(wf , σ) < xˆ2(wf , σ) (60)
at all pairs of values (wf , σ). The households are otherwise identical, in that
they have the same preferences and face the same net wage rates, prior to
any policy change. These assumptions imply in turn that n∗1 > n
∗
2, z
∗
1 > z
∗
2 .
The situation in respect of total bought-in child care is ambiguous, because
although type-2 households are assumed to use more of this per child, they
27A simple example of a production function that has these results is ni = Bizbii x
1−bi
i ,
i = 1, 2, with B1 > B2, b1 > b2.
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have fewer children. However, we assume x∗1 < x
∗
2. Thus we have two house-
hold types, one of which has more children, lower female labor supply and
lower bought-in child care, both per child and in total. In this section we
examine how the relative proportions of the two household types in the econ-
omy influence the way in which the tax structure and system of child support
affect the relationship between fertility and female labor supply.
The extension to two household types has important implications for the
interpretation of the tax system. Type-1 households have a lower income
from market labor supply, and so, under a tax system in which the marginal
tax rate depends on joint market income, they will face a lower tax rate
and would have a higher net wage than type-2 households. Since we wish
to assume, for simplicity, that the two household types face the same pre-
change net wage, the tax rate τ will be interpreted as a flat rate income tax.
First, we consider in this section the effects of an increase in the child pay-
ment, financed by an increase in the flat rate of income tax, which of course
“rewards” higher fertility households and “punishes” lower fertility house-
holds by redistributing income from the latter to the former, as advocated
by some policy analysts.We consider next the effects of a revenue neutral
reduction in the tax rate on women and increase in that on men, which can
be interpreted as a move towards progressive individual taxation. Finally we
examine the effects of a revenue neutral reduction in the tax rate for type-1,
and an increase in that for type-2 households, which can be interpreted as a
move toward joint taxation with a tax rate depending on household market
labor income. The aim in each of these comparative statics exercises is to
see how the tax and child support systems interact to determine the rela-
tionship between female labor supply and fertility, this time in the presence
of across-household heterogeneity.
It is important to note that, in this model, type-1 households have higher
utility than type-2 households, because as (14) shows, the household with the
lower implicit price of children will have a higher budget constraint. Thus
the indirect utility function for a household of type i is
ui = γ ln
γW
pi(wf , σ)− g + (1− γ) ln(1− γ)W (1 + rt+1) (61)
The households have the same net full income W and receive the same pay-
ment g per child, and so
u1 > u2 ⇔ p1(wf , σ) < p2(wf , σ) (62)
18
Recall that type 1 households have the lower net household income from
market labor supply. This underlines the inadequacy of the latter as a welfare
indicator in the presence of household production. It also means that the
result in (62) would be strengthened if the tax system were progressive on
the basis of joint market income, rather than flat rate as assumed here.
In the steady state, let Nit denote the number of households of type i,
and φi ≡ Nit/Nt the proportion of type i households, which is assumed to
stay constant over time.28 Nit evolves according to
Nit = φiNt = φi
2∑
j=1
n∗jNj,t−1 φi ∈ (0, 1),
∑
i
φi = 1 (63)
The government budget constraint in the steady state now becomes,∑
i
Nit{τ [w1(2− z∗i ) + w2]− gn∗i − σx∗i } = 0 (64)
This says simply that tax revenue on labor incomes must cover expenditures
on child payments and subsidies on child care, if any. Since Nit = φiNt, we
can write the government budget constraint in average per household terms
as
τ [w1(2− z¯∗) + w2]− gn¯∗ − σx¯∗ = 0 (65)
where z¯∗ ≡∑i φiz∗i , n¯∗ ≡∑i φin∗i , and x¯∗ ≡∑i φix∗i .
This government budget constraint implies, since z∗1 > z
∗
2 , and n
∗
1 > n
∗
2,
that type-1 households pay less tax and receive more in child payments than
type-2 households29. The overall distributional effect depends also on the last
component of the transfer. Empirically however, σ is typically very small,
if not zero. Overall we conclude that there is a net transfer from type 2 to
type 1 households, which is regressive, since the latter have higher utility.
We now consider how the tax structure and child support system interact to
determine the relationship between fertility and female labor supply in the
case of heterogeneous households.
(i) Increase in the child payment, financed by an increase in the tax rate.
The first point to note is that in this model this is regressive, since it increases
28This implies that not all the children of one household type form households of that
type.
29This conclusion would be strengthened if the tax system were progressive on joint
income rather than flat rate.
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the size of the transfer from type-2 to type-1 households. To isolate the effect
on fertility, total differentiation of the government budget constraint gives
dτ = λdg (66)
where
λ ≡ τw1
∂z¯∗
∂g
+ n¯∗ + g ∂n¯
∗
∂g
w1(2− z¯∗) + w2 − w1 ∂z¯∗∂τ − g ∂n¯
∗
∂τ
> 0 (67)
λ represents the balanced budget marginal rate of substitution between τ and
g, and is clearly larger, the larger the fall in female labor supply resulting
from the increased tax rate. We then have the effect on fertility in each
household type:
dn∗i =
∂n∗i
∂τ
dτ +
∂n∗i
∂g
dg (68)
= (λ
∂n∗i
∂τ
+
∂n∗i
∂g
)dg (69)
Inserting the specific expressions for the two partial derivatives and rearrang-
ing gives
dn∗i
dg
< 0⇔ pi − g > 1− τ
λ
+ (1− τ)w1zˆi (70)
or
xˆi > g +
1− τ
λ
(71)
Thus if the expenditure on bought-in child care is sufficiently large, the net
effect of the policy is to reduce fertility. This expenditure can be smaller, the
lower the child payment, the higher the tax rate, and the higher the rate at
which the tax rate must be increased to finance a given increase in the child
payment. Taking the set of all households, this condition may be satisfied
for all of them, type-2 households only (since xˆ2 > xˆ1), or none of them. In
the first case average fertility certainly falls, in the second case we require
the condition
dn¯∗
dg
=
∑
i
φi
dn∗i
dg
< 0⇔ −dn
∗
2
dg
>
φ1
φ2
dn∗1
dg
(72)
which is more likely to be satisfied, the higher the expenditure on bought-in
child care in both household types and the greater the proportion of type-2
households in the population. We summarise this discussion in:
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Proposition 6: An increase in the child payment, funded by raising tax-
ation, as well as being regressive, also reduces average per household fertility
if (a) expenditure on bought-in child care is sufficiently large, in the sense
of condition (71), for all households, or (b) this holds only for type-2 house-
holds, and the proportion of them in the population is sufficiently large in the
sense of condition (72)
(ii) A move toward individual taxation, in which secondary earners pay a
lower tax rate than primary earners. The effect of this is to increase the net
income of type-2 households and reduce that of type 1 households. Here we
want to focus on the overall impact on fertility.
First, totally differentiating through the government budget constraint
gives
dτf = −µdτm (73)
where
µ ≡ (w1 + w2)−
∑
i φi(τfw1zˆi + g)
∂n∗i
∂τm
w1(1− z¯∗)−
∑
i φi(τfw1
∂z∗i
∂τf
+ g
∂n∗i
∂τf
)
(74)
Since ∂n∗i /∂τm < 0, the numerator is positive and gives the sum of the
marginal increase in tax from increasing the male tax rate, and the increase
in net revenue which results from the induced fall in fertility. The latter is
the sum of the gain in tax revenue from the diversion of the mother’s time
away from child care, and the direct payment per child. The denominator
is almost certainly positive and less than the numerator. The first term is
the marginal effect on tax revenue of a change in the female tax rate, and is
smaller, the smaller the average household female labor supply. It is certainly
less than w1 + w2. The term τfw1
∂z∗i
∂τf
> 0, if female labor supply increases
with the net wage, which seems empirically to be the case, and is larger, the
more elastic is female labor supply with respect to the net wage. Finally,
we know from the preceding section30 that
∂n∗i
∂τf
>
∂n∗i
∂τm
, and so the last term
in the denominator is certainly larger than the corresponding term in the
numerator. Thus we conclude µ > 1. Moreover, µ will be larger, the smaller
the existing average female labor supply per household and the larger the
elasticity of average household female labor supply with respect to the net
wage.
30Clearly w1(z∗i − γ) > −γ(w1 + w2).
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Turning now to average fertility n¯∗, we have
dn¯∗ =
∑
i
φi(
∂n∗i
∂τm
dτm +
∂n∗i
∂τf
dτf ) (75)
=
∑
i
φi(
∂n∗i
∂τm
− µ∂n
∗
i
∂τf
)dτm (76)
A sufficient condition for dn¯∗ > 0 is that the term in brackets, dn∗i , be positive
for both i. A necessary condition is that it be positive for at least one i. To
evaluate this term we substitute for the partial derivatives and rearrange to
obtain the condition
dn∗i > 0⇔ µ >
1 + w2
w1
1− z∗i
γ
(77)
We can intepret the numerator on the right hand side as a measure of the
“gender gap”, since w2 is the difference between the male and female wage.
We saw in Proposition 1 that the smaller is z∗i /γ, the more likely it is that
a rise in the female net wage increases fertility. Finally, by definition µ
measures the rate at which τf can be reduced as τm increases. Since z
∗
1 > z
∗
2 ,
it is more likely that this condition will be satisfied for type 2 households
than for type 1. We summarise in
Proposition 7: The smaller is the gender gap, the lower the level of
domestic child care relative to the strength of preference for children, the
larger the rate of substitution between primary and secondary earner tax rates,
and the larger the proportion of type-2 households in the economy, the more
likely is it that a revenue neutral move toward individual taxation will increase
average fertility.
(iii) The effects on average fertility of revenue neutral changes in tax rates
on households. We consider the effects of revenue neutral changes dτ2 > 0 >
dτ1, where τi is the tax rate paid by household of type i = 1, 2, and the rates
are equal initially. The balanced budget requirement implies that
dτ2 = −θφ1
φ2
dτ1 (78)
where
θ ≡ w1(2− z
∗
1) + w2 − τ1w1 ∂z
∗
1
∂τ1
− g ∂n1
∂τ1
w1(2− z∗2) + w2 − τ2w1 ∂z
∗
2
∂τ2
− g ∂n2
∂τ2
> 0 (79)
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The change in average fertility is
dn¯∗ = φ1
∂n∗1
∂τ1
dτ1 + φ2
∂n∗2
∂τ2
dτ2 (80)
= φ1(
∂n∗1
∂τ1
− θ∂n
∗
2
∂τ2
)dτ1 (81)
Then we have
Proposition 8: if the condition in (21) of Proposition 1 is satisfied
for type 2 households and not for type-1 households, then regardless of the
proportions of the two types in the population, average fertility falls when
dτ2 > 0 > dτ1.
The reason for this is simply that an increase in the net female wage
reduces fertility in type-1 households, as in the Galor-Weil model, while a
fall in the net wage also reduces fertility of type 2 households, if (21) holds,
and so fertility must fall, i.e. in (74) dn¯∗ < 0,because ∂n∗1/∂τ1 > 0 , ∂n
∗
2/∂τ2
< 0 and dτ1 < 0.
5 Conclusions
Historically in virtually all developed economies there seems to be clear ev-
idence of an inverse relationship between female labor supply and fertility.
However, particularly in the last decade or so, the relationship across coun-
tries has been positive: for example countries like Germany, Italy and Spain
with the lowest fertility rates also have the lowest female participation rates.
We accept the hypothesis that the reason for this lies in the combined effects
of a country’s tax system and system of child support, and we have sought to
clarify this theoretically, using an extended version of the Galor-Weil model.
The results do suggest that countries with individual rather than joint taxa-
tion, and which support families through improved availibility of alternatives
to domestic child care, rather than through direct child payments, are likely
to have both higher female labor supply and higher fertility. These results
are strengthened when we take account of the heterogeneity among house-
holds which undoubtedly exists. The presence of a significant proportion
of households with relatively high levels of child care outside the home in-
creases the likelihood of a positive relationship between fertility and female
labor supply. Thus a reversal of the trend in fertility, which many regard
as vital to resolve the problems for social security programs presented by
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ageing populations, need not be bought at the cost of significant reductions
in female labor supply.
Appendix
In order to focus on the primary concerns of this paper, it is useful to
begin by excluding the effects of changes in w1 and k, which are in any case
usually ambiguous. We assume therefore that w1 stays constant throughout
the comparative statics analysis31. We also assume that initially σ = 0,
which is reasonably realistic and reduces the dimensionality of the system
to be studied. This means that we can work with a relatively simple steady
state system:
n∗ − γ[(1− τf )w1 + (1− τm)(w1 + w2)]
p[(1− τf )w1, σ]− g = 0 (82)
z∗ − zˆ[(1− τf )w1, σ]n∗ = 0 (83)
τfw1(1− z∗) + τm(w1 + w2)− gn∗ − σx∗ = 0 (84)
where under a flat rate taxation system τf = τm = τ. The relevant partial
derivatives are
∂n
∂τf
=
w1nzˆ − γw1
p− g R 0 (85)
∂n
∂τm
=
−γ(w1 + w2)
p− g < 0 (86)
∂n
∂τ
=
∂n
∂τf
+
∂n
∂τm
R 0 (87)
∂n
∂σ
=
x
p− g > 0 (88)
∂n
∂g
=
n
p− g > 0 (89)
∂zˆ
∂τf
= −w1 ∂zˆ
∂(1− τf )w1 > 0 (90)
∂zˆ
∂σ
= − ∂zˆ
∂(1− σ) < 0 (91)
31The assumption of constant gross wage rates is quite usual in the analysis of tax policy.
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We analyse the cases (i) - (iv), and give proofs for the corresponding Propo-
sitions 2 - 5, in turn.
Case (i): Here we take an exogenous increase in g, with n∗, z∗ and τ
endogenous, and τ increasing to fund the increase in child payment. The
comparative statics results are derived from the linear system 1 0 −∂n∂τ−zˆ 1 −n∗ ∂zˆ
∂τ−g −τw1 w1(2− z∗) + w2
 dn∗dz∗
dτ
 =
 ∂n∂g0
n∗
 dg (92)
The determinant of the left hand matrix is
∆ = w1(2− z∗) + w2 − τw1n∗ ∂zˆ
∂τ
− ∂n
∂τ
(τw1zˆ + g) (93)
This expression is the net effect on tax revenue of an increase in the tax rate,
and so it is reasonable to assume ∆ > 0. We then have
dn∗
dg
=
∂n
∂g
(w1(2− zˆ) + w2 − τw1n∗ ∂zˆ∂τ ) + n∗ ∂n∂τ
∆
(94)
dz∗
dg
=
∂n
∂g
[zˆ(w1(2− z∗) + w2) + gn∗ ∂zˆ∂τ ] + n∗(zˆ ∂n∂τ + n∗ ∂zˆ∂τ )
∆
(95)
By inserting the specific expressions for the derivatives into these equations
and rearranging, we obtain the conditions
dn∗
dg
< 0⇔ τ
zˆ
∂zˆ
∂τ
>
(1− γ)
z∗
(2 +
w2
w1
) (96)
dz∗
dg
> 0⇔ pn
∗
zˆ
∂zˆ
∂τ
+ (1− γ)(2w1 + w2) > 0 (97)
The latter condition is obviously satisfied since all terms on the right are
positive. The former condition is discussed in the text.
Case (ii): Here we take an exogenous change in g, treating n∗, z∗ and σ
as endogenous. In this case we have the system 1 0 −∂n∂σ−zˆ 1 −n∗ ∂zˆ
∂σ−g −τfw1 −x∗
 dn∗dz∗
dσ
 =
 ∂n∂g0
n∗
 dg (98)
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The determinant of the left hand matrix is
∆ = −(x∗ + (g + τfw1zˆ)∂n
∂σ
)− τfw1n∗ ∂zˆ
∂σ
(99)
This is the net impact on the government budget of an increase in the subsidy
σ, and it is reasonabe to assume ∆ < 0, despite the fact that the last term
is positive because ∂zˆ
∂σ
< 0. This last term gives the increase in tax revenue
arising from the increase in female labor supply induced by an increase in
the subsidy.
It is straightforward to show that
dn∗
dg
=
−τfw1n∗ ∂zˆ∂σ ∂n∂g
∆
< 0 (100)
so that a revenue neutral increase in σ and reduction in g increases fertility.
Similarly one can show that
dz∗
dg
=
(n∗ + g ∂n
∂g
) ∂zˆ
∂σ
∆
> 0 (101)
so that female labor supply certainly rises when g falls. In both cases the ef-
fects are greater, the larger is ∂zˆ
∂σ
in absolute value, i.e.the larger the elasticity
of substitution between the two types of child care.
Case (iii): Here we consider a balanced budget reduction in both g
and τf , i.e. a reduction in the female tax rate funded by cutting the child
payment. Thus we take an exogenous dg, with n∗, z∗ and τf endogenous.
We have the system 1 0 −
∂n
∂τf
−zˆ 1 −n∗ ∂zˆ
∂τf
−g −τfw1 w1(1− z∗)

 dn∗dz∗
dτf
 =
 ∂n∂g0
n∗
 dg (102)
This yields the total derivatives
dz∗
dg
=
∂n
∂g
(w(1− z∗)zˆ + gn∗ ∂zˆ
∂τf
) + n∗(zˆ ∂n
∂τf
+ n∗ ∂zˆ
∂τf
)
∆
(103)
dn∗
dg
=
∂n
∂g
(w(1− z∗)− τfw1n∗ ∂zˆ∂τf ) + n∗ ∂n∂τf
∆
(104)
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where ∆ > 0 as in case (i). Inserting the specific expressions for the partial
derivatives and cancelling terms then gives
dz∗
dg
=
(1− γ)w1 + pn∗zˆ ∂zˆ∂τf
∆
> 0 (105)
so that reducing g certainly increases female labor supply, and
dn∗
dg
=
(1− γ)− n∗τf ∂zˆ∂τf
∆
R 0 (106)
For a reduction in g to increase fertility we require this to be negative, which
implies the condition given and discussed in the text.
Case (iv). Here we take an exogenously given dτm, with n
∗, z∗ and
τf endogenous. The corresponding differentials dn
∗, dz∗, dτf must satisfy
the government budget constraint32, i.e. must be revenue neutral. The
comparative statics results are derived from the linear system 1 0 −
∂n
∂τf
−zˆ 1 −n∗ ∂zˆ
∂τf
−g −τfw1 w1(1− z∗)

 dn∗dz∗
dτf
 =
 ∂n∂τm0
−(w1 + w2)
 dτm (107)
The determinant of the left hand matrix is
∆ = w1(1− z∗)− τfw1n∗ ∂zˆ
∂τf
− (g + τfw1zˆ) ∂n
∂τf
(108)
This term is the net marginal tax revenue from an increase in τf , taking into
account the loss of revenue resulting from a reduction in female labor supply
(the second term) and the cost associated with an increase in fertility (the
third term). We assume that ∆ > 0, since otherwise tax revenue could be
increased by reducing tax rates. We then have that
dn∗
dτm
=
∂n
∂τm
(w1(1− z∗)− τfw1n∗ ∂zˆ∂τf )− (w1 + w2) ∂n∂τf
∆
(109)
dz∗
dτm
=
∂n
∂τm
(w1(1− z∗)zˆ + gn∗ ∂zˆ∂τf )− (w1 + w2)(zˆ ∂n∂τf + n∗ ∂zˆ∂τf )
∆
(110)
Inserting the relevant partial derivatives and rearranging then gives the re-
sults reported in Proposition 5 of the text.
32We can ignore dx∗ because of the assumption σ = 0.
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     Table 1: % female employment and TFR                      
 
Year 1970 1990 
 % fem emp
25-44* 
TFR** % fem emp
25-44* 
TFR** 
Germany 47.15 2.03 59.50 1.45 
Australia 41.60 2.86 63.05 1.91 
UK 50.50 2.43 67.05 1.83 
US 42.55 2.48 70.05 2.08 
Canada 37.15 2.33 69.75 1.71 
NL 23.30 2.57 53.30 1.59 
Sweden 62.55 1.97 89.45 2.13 
Norway 49.45 2.50 74.70 1.93 
Finland 69.50 1.83 84.15 1.78 
France 47.35 2.47 63.85 1.78 
Italy 28.80 2.42 44.95 1.33 
Spain 22.10 2.9 31.25 1.36 
  *Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics: from tables for participation   
and unemployment for women aged 25 to 44 years 
  **TFR:  average number of children a woman would expect to have  
if she were to experience all of the age-specific birth rate  
      occurring in that year.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: TFR and % female employment 1970
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Figure 2:TFR and % female employment 1990
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